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Abstract  There is an increasing trend of firms undertaking share repurchases in Malaysia, yet limited studies on 
repurchase activities have been published. This study attempts to examine managerial mot ives for repurchase in Malaysia 
using signaling and substitution hypotheses. Unlike firms in  western countries, firms  in  Malaysia are bound by strict ru les and 
regulations before embarking on repurchases, thus it is argued that motives for share repurchases would be different from 
those of the developed markets. The results of this study are consistent with signaling hypothesis where Malaysian firms 
repurchase shares partly to signal undervaluation and better operating performance. They also buy back shares whenever 
there is an increase in cash flows. However, there is no evidence to support that these firms bought back shares to substitute 
dividend payments as documented by studies from western countries. In fact, repurchases are used to complement dividends. 
Further evidence shows that managerial ownership has significant influence on firms’ repurchase decisions.  
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1. Introduction 
Share repurchases (SR) have become an important 
phenomenon in corporate distribution policy in the US 
(e.g.[1-5]). Malaysian firms are also actively participating in 
repurchase activities. From the inception year in 1997 until 
December 2005, 305 firms or about 25 percent of all listed 
firms have participated in  repurchases activities[6]. However, 
studies pertaining to repurchases in emerg ing economies as 
in Malaysia are limited and have focused main ly on the 
announcement effects of repurchases. 
Numerous studies in the west and developed market as 
in[4] and[8] have established that firms repurchase shares to 
substitute for dividends payments. To the authors’ 
knowledge, there is limited documented empirical evidence 
on substitution motive of share repurchases in emerging 
market as in Malaysia. Furthermore, it is argued that such 
motive may not be relevant in emerging economies main ly 
due to different ownership patterns prevalent in many 
Malaysian firms. Thus, this study attempts to empirically 
examine motives of repurchases decision in Malaysia using 
signaling and substitution hypotheses. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
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Share repurchases (SR) are formally allowed late in 1997 
by Malaysian government after the Asian financial crisis of 
1997. Unlike repurchases in the United States, the only 
method of SR allowed  in  Malaysia is through the open 
market. Malaysian firms must adhere to specific rules and 
guidance provided by the Bursa Malaysia listing 
requirements in order to embark on SR[7]. The guidelines in 
Chapter 12 of Bursa Listing Requirements specify the size of 
share repurchase which is not more than 10 percent of 
prevailing ordinary shares and the price offered should not 
be more than 15 percent above the weighted average market 
price for the shares for the 5 market days immediately before 
the purchase. The same ru le applies for the resale of shares so 
bought.  
Economic theory provides several mot ives as to why firms 
buy back their own shares which include but not limited to:  
a) signal undervaluation, b) d isgorge excess cash flow, c) 
substitute cash dividends for repurchase, d) satisfy 
management interests, e) reduce tax, and f) maintain optimal 
leverage level (e.g.[1-5]). This paper will concentrate on the 
signaling and substitution hypotheses. 
2.1. Signaling Hypothesis 
Signaling hypothesis predicts that managers, having privy 
informat ion on their firms, would be impelled to correct 
mispricing of their shares. One way of doing this is by 
announcing buyback intentions. This action implies that 
managers have strong beliefs that their firms are good 
investments and the reason for poor price performance 
would be due to market  conditions. Reference[3] finds 
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consistent evidence for signaling hypothesis from a survey of 
194 top financial executives who engaged in open market 
share repurchase activities. A majority of the respondents 
(74.6 percent) cited that undervalued stock price is the most 
important reason leading to the announcement of buyback 
programs. From a questionnaires survey conducted among 
the largest 200 UK firms,[8] finds that most of the 
respondents believe that the important reasons for firms to 
buy back shares are related to information signaling 
hypothesis, leverage hypothesis and investment hypothesis. 
Signaling hypothesis proposes that managers initiate 
repurchases to signal the public that their firms either a) are 
currently undervalued, or b) would experience increase in 
earnings in the future or c) are expecting reduction in firms’ 
systematic risks. Extensive studies substantiate that these 
facets of signaling hypotheses were evidenced in their 
research but were not necessarily present simultaneously 
(e.g.[5] &[9]). References[8-9] find consistent evidence for 
signaling hypothesis from a survey of financial executives 
who engaged in share repurchases. Therefore it  is 
hypothesized that; 
H1: Firms with poor prior price perfo rmance are more 
likely to repurchase shares. 
H2: Firms with better operating performance are more 
likely to repurchase shares. 
Reference[10] argues that managers of cash-rich firms are 
subjected to severe agency problems. Having more free cash 
at their disposal, managers are likely to over-invest in 
negative net present value (NPV) pro jects, consume more 
discretionary perquisites for private benefit, or unnecessarily 
retain cash. When firms  distribute cash dividends to 
shareholders, the firms are actually reducing their agency 
costs. Free cash flow hypothesis posits that shareholders 
with excess funds should benefit from share repurchases. In 
comparison to dividend payments, disbursement of cash 
through share buybacks offers managers the flexibility to 
manage the magnitude and timing of disbursements of 
excess cash.  
There is inconclusive evidence pertaining to the 
importance of d isgorging excess free cash flow in share 
repurchase decisions. References[11] and[12] find no 
support for excess free cash flow hypothesis for firms that 
initiate tender offer share repurchases announcements. 
However, many studies establish support for Jensen’s theory 
of disgorging excess free cash flow (e.g.[2] &[13]). Mature 
firms with low growth opportunities tend to invest in 
unprofitable projects. By repurchasing its own shares, a firm 
is actually distributing the excess cash flow back to its 
shareholders and thus reducing the agency cost associated 
with free cash flow. SR conveys a positive indication that 
managers do not engage in opportunistic behavior. Instead of 
embarking in unprofitable projects or acquisitions, the 
managers choose to distribute firms’ excess cash back to 
shareholders. Therefore it is hypothesized that; 
H3: Firms with excess cash are more likely to repurchase 
shares.  
2.2. Substitution Hypothesis 
Reference[14] considers dividends and share repurchases 
as perfect substitute. For decades, US firms preferred to pay 
out cash in the forms of dividends over share repurchases 
despite the disadvantages of tax t reatment on dividends 
payment. However, the trend is reversing. Reference[4] 
reports that while div idends payment grew at an average rate 
of 7.5 percent per year over the period  1980 - 1998 in the US, 
share repurchases volume has grown at an average rate of 
28.3 percent during the same period of time.  
Theoretically, after a firm paid  cash dividends, the price of 
its shares would come down proportionately with the amount 
of dividends paid[15]. Interestingly,[2],[16] , and[17] find 
that the announcement of corporate intention to buy back its 
shares would push the price upward with an  average return of 
3 to 4 percent observed during the announcement period. 
Positive price reaction after SR certainly g ives strong 
inclination for a firm to choose buybacks rather than cash 
dividends. Unlike dividend announcements, share buyback 
announcements are not liabilities. It is not necessary for 
firms to actually buy back their own shares in order to gain 
its benefits. Furthermore, not all shareholders equally 
participate in buybacks. Despite this inequality, repurchase is 
considered as a great tool for management especially if 
flexib ility is needed in a distribution policy. Managers can 
determine the appropriate amount of shares they are required 
to repurchase whenever the need arises (e.g.[2] &[5]). 
Reference[4] argues that if buybacks and cash dividends 
are substitutes and assuming that managers are concerned 
with shareholders benefits, managers would choose the 
distribution policy that would maximize shareholders’ utility 
functions. The introduction of Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA 1986) in the US reduced the gap between taxes on 
capital gains and dividends. Given that TRA 1986 reduced 
the potential capital gain benefits, which firms have enjoyed 
previously, it is expected that buyback activities would be 
slightly less evident after 1986. They reported that the mean 
(median) market reaction for firms announcing buybacks 
decision prior to TRA 1986 was a positive 3.49 percent (2.56 
percent) while those that announced buyback intentions after 
approval of tax reform 1986 experienced market  reaction of 
a positive 2.42 percent (1.65 percent) and the differences are 
significant at 1 percent level. Th is finding supports that TRA 
1986 causes repurchases to be less attractive.  
Reference[2] finds lack of evidence to support the notion 
that firms repurchased shares to replace dividends in the US 
for the period from 1977 to 1996. In a censored regression 
analysis,[2] uses dividend payout as a proxy for substitution 
hypothesis. Dividend payout is the ratio of cash dividends 
paid to net income in the year prior to actual buybacks. The 
coefficient of div idend payout is consistently positive and 
significant in  most of the sample years suggesting that firms 
that bought back their shares do not use funds that otherwise 
would be used to pay dividends. Reference[18] examines 
flexib ility and substitution hypotheses of share repurchases 
and dividends using time-series vector autoregression. The 
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study finds that repurchases are mostly related to temporary 
earnings but not dividends and both repurchases and 
dividends are not related to permanent earnings. Therefore, 
[18] concludes that share repurchases and dividends are not 
perfect substitutes. Likewise, recent survey conducted by[8] 
also shows weak support to the idea that firms  buy back 
shares to replace div idend payments. In other words, firms 
do not substitute dividends for buybacks. 
References[19] and[20] show that repurchases are 
increasingly becoming the dominant payout method among 
firms in the US. Using Litner regression model on 25 years 
of data (1980 to 2005) to examine the relationship between 
dividends and buybacks to earnings,[20] finds that there is a 
strong relationship between earnings and buybacks but weak 
relationship between earnings and dividends; thus, 
supportive to the idea that repurchase is the preferred method 
of cash distributions. In summary, there is inconclusive 
evidence as to whether share repurchase is a perfect 
substitute for cash dividends. Therefore it is hypothesized 
that: 
H4: Firms are more likely to reduce dividends to embark 
on repurchases. 
2.3. Control Variables 
Many firms in Malaysia are characterized by concentrated 
ownership whereby significant portion of equity is owned by 
individual or group of individuals, as in  reference[6]. Given 
that these individuals’ wealth is tight up with firm’s financial 
decisions, it is expected that ownership would have 
significant influence in share repurchase decision in 
Malaysia. This study uses managerial or director ownership 
as a proxy for ownership influence in share repurchases 
decision. Previous studies have shown that size and growth 
opportunities affect share repurchases decisions. Likewise, 
this study employs market to book value (MTBV) and 
market value (MV) as proxies for growth opportunities and 
size respectively. 
3. Sample and Methods 
One major d ifference of this study as compared to other 
studies is that it focuses only on firms that carried out 
repurchasing activities. In Malaysia, a firm is required to get 
shareholders’ approval before it can repurchase its shares 
and that approval is only valid for a period of one year. This 
setting allows us to investigate why firms repurchased shares 
in certain years and not others. Focusing only on 
repurchasing firms gives a better picture of repurchasing 
motives than comparing between repurchasing and 
non-repurchasing firms as non-repurchasing firms might not 
engage in repurchases because of other reasons such as it is 
not their financial policy.  
The sample includes all public listed companies on Bursa 
Malaysia Main Market that repurchased shares from 1999 to 
April 2006. Finance-related companies and utilities firms are 
excluded from the sample as these firms are bound by 
different regulations. A total of 122 non-financial and 
non-utility firms repurchase their shares are identified from 
Datastream database and annual reports. To ensure that 
repurchases implementations present measurable impact on 
firms’ financial figures, only firms that have bought back 
cumulat ively more than 1 percent of their shares outstanding 
from the year 1999 to April 2006 are included in the final 
sample. This condition produces a final sample of 80 
repurchase firms.  
Financial data are collected for each firm from the year 
prior to the first repurchase year. The process above 
produces a sample of 364 firm-year observations, consisting 
of 122 non-repurchase firm-years and 242 of actual 
repurchase firm-years as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Share repurchases observation 





1999 0 2 2 
2000 10 8 18 
2001 9 19 28 
2002 23 19 42 
2003 22 26 48 
2004 35 35 70 
2005 15 63 78 
2006 6 72 78 
Total 122 242 364 
*N-SR is non repurchasing observations  
**SR is repurchasing observations  
Tobit regression is used to estimate the following 
equation: 
SRi,t = α + β1M1 i,t-1 + M2 i,t + M3 i,t + M4 i,t  
+ DIR i,t-1+ DIR2 i,t-1 + MTBV i,t-1 + MV i,t + ε i,t    (1) 
Where, SR is the number of shares repurchased during the 
year scaled by the number of ordinary shares outstanding for 
the year. M1 is the prior 12-month cumulative market 
adjusted abnormal return in the previous year (CAR12M). 
M2 is the change in EBITDA of current year from that of the 
prior year where EBITDA is the ratio  of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortizat ion to total assets. 
M3 is the change in cash level in current year as compared to 
the cash level in the previous year. Cash level is measured as 
cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets. M4 is the 
change in dividend per share of the current year to that of the 
prior year. Div idend per share is calculated as cash dividends 
paid scaled by average number of o rdinary shares 
outstanding.  
DIR is the percentage of managerial ownership in  the firm. 
It is expected that the relat ion between managerial ownership 
and repurchase decision is non-linear therefore DIR2 is 
included in the regression model. Prev ious studies have 
identified that size and growth opportunities have significant 
influence on firms’ financial decisions as in[2] and[5]. This 
study uses size as measured by natural log of market value 
(MV) and market to book value (MTBV) as a measure of 
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growth opportunities. Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses 
tested in the study and the expected sign. 
Table 2.  Summary of hypotheses tested and expected sign 
Variables Proxy Hypothesis Expected sign 
M1 Prior CAR12M Signaling of undervaluation -ve 
M2 ∆ in EBITDA Signaling of operating performance +ve 
M3 ∆ in Cash Signaling of excess cash flow +ve 
M4 ∆ in Dividend per share Substitution -ve 
4. Findings and Analysis 
Table 3 describe minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation for all variables tested. On average firm 
repurchased 1.18% of their shares outstanding which is 
marked ly lower than the average shares bought back by 
firms in the western markets, typically about 5%-6%.  The 
sample firms have positive changes in EBITDA, changes in 
cash flow, changes in dividends per share and experienced 
positive 1.7% cumulat ive average abnormal returns prior to 
the repurchases.  Managerial ownership is rather h igh with 
the mean of 42.19 %. Reference[22] also finds that the 
average board ownership in Malaysia is about 43.44%. The 
mean market value for the sample is RM885 millions with 
the maximum value of RM13, 982 millions. 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistic 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
SR .0000 .1702 0.0118 0.0190 
M1 -1.9119 2.3561 0.0174 0.5019 
M2 -0.5251 1.2265 0.0095 0.1109 
M3 -0.6025 0.8172 0.0079 0.0854 
M4 -0.8805 0.9607 0.0056 0.1074 
DIR 0.0000 0.8502 0.4219 0.1927 
MKTBV 0.2300 5.9600 1.1604 0.8834 
MV 14.7800 13982.58 885.29 1687.17 
Table 4.  Nonparametric correlations 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 DIR MTBV 
M1 .      
M2 0.083      
M3 0.053 0.106     
M4 0.130* -0.005 0.042    
DIR 0.153** 0.055 0.018 0.098   
MTBV 0.282 0.011 0.083 0.109 0.182  
MV 0.279 0.009 0.090 0.161 0.064 0.566 
**,* denotes significant at 5 % and 10% level respectively 
Table 4 shows the nonparametric correlat ions of 
independent variables. It is safe to say that the model does 
not suffer from multicolinearity as none of the coefficient is 
above 0.5. 
Table 5 shows the results of tobit regression on the 
motives of share repurchases in Malaysia. The results 
support signaling hypothesis as the coefficient fo r MI 
(CAR12M), the prior 12-month cumulative average 
abnormal returns is significantly negative at 1%. Managers 
believe that their share prices were mistakenly undervalued 
and believe that there would be better performance in the 
future. Managers’ belief is supported with the positive 
coefficient on M2 (Changes in EBITDA), a proxy  for future 
operating performance. The result is also significant at 1%. 
Therefore, these results show that managers embark on share 
repurchases to signal underpricing and to convey positive 
outlook of their firms. 
Several studies document that cash levels are positively 
associated with buyback decisions (see for example[2],[5] 
and[21]). These studies support Jensen’s agency theory that 
predicts that firms with excess free cash flow would mitigate 
agency problems by distributing excess cash in the form of 
dividends or share repurchases. The coefficient of M3 
(Changes in cash) is positive and marg inally significant, 
which supports free cash flow hypothesis.  
Table 5.  Tobit regression result on motives of repurchases 
Variables Coefficient t-stat p-value 
M1 -0.0094 -3.25 0.001*** 
M2 0.05890 4.73 0.000*** 
M3 0.0323 1.93 0.055* 
M4 0.0340 2.31 0.021** 
DIR 0.0475 1.90 0.058* 
DIR2 -0.0691 -2.15 0.032** 
MTBV -0.0052 -2.54 0.012** 
MV 0.0019 1.64 0.103 
***, **,* denotes significant at 1%, 5 % and 10% level respectively 
It is hypothesized that firms repurchase shares to 
substitute for div idends. On the contrary, the result in  Table 5 
demonstrates that M4 (Changes in dividends per share) is 
significantly positive. This result shows that dividend- 
paying firms also repurchased more of their shares. Firms do 
not buy back shares to replace div idends payments but on top 
of paying div idends, firms also repurchase shares to 
distribute funds to shareholders. The result failed  to accept 
the null hypothesis that firms repurchase shares to substitute 
for div idend payments. Table 6 demonstrates this issue 
further by comparing the total amount of cash spent for 
repurchasing shares and paying cash dividends for sample 
firms from 1999 to April 2006. It is clear from the table that 
firms spent more money on paying dividends than they do in 
repurchasing shares. Overall, firms spent 7.1% of EBITDA 
for buying back shares and 17.3% of EBITDA to pay 
dividends.  
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Table 6.  Yearly cash distribution in RM millions 
 a b c d e f g 
Year SR          RM mil 
DIV      
RM mil 
Total     
RM mil 
EBITDA     
RM mil %  DIV % SR 
% Total 
payout 
1999 3.0 0.129 3.1 495 0.03% 1% 1% 
2000 157 446 603 4,463 10% 4% 14% 
2001 657 1,106 1,763 5,762 19% 11% 31% 
2002 146 1,018 1,164 5,954 17% 2% 20% 
2003 295 1,281 1,576 7,549 17% 4% 21% 
2004 413 1,635 2,047 8,201 20% 5% 25% 
2005 1,443 1,875 3,317 10,536 18% 14% 31% 
2006 689 1,944 2,633 10,937 18% 6% 24% 
Total 3,801 9,305 13,106 53,898 17% 7% 24% 
SR is the amount spent for share repurchases in RM millions. 
DIV is the amount spent for cash dividends in RM millions. 
Colum a and b is the total amount spent in million RM for share repurchases and cash dividends by 364 sample firms respectively.  
Colum c is the total cash distribution in RM million for the year; column d is the total amount of EBITDA for sample firms. 
Column f is % of cash spent for SR scaled by Total EBITDA (column d). 
Column e is the % of cash spent for DIV for the year scaled by Total EBITDA (column d) and Colum g is the % of cash spent on SR and DIV scaled by Total 
EBITDA (column d) 
DIR and DIR2 test the importance of managerial hold ings 
in share repurchase decisions. It is found that both variables 
are significant in influencing repurchase decision. The 
higher is the managerial ownership, the more likely a firm 
would repurchase share. The result also indicates that there is 
a nonlinear relationship between director’s holdings and 
share repurchases decision. Growth opportunities level as 
measured by market to book ratio  (MTBV) p lay vital ro le in 
share repurchase decision. The negative coefficient of 
MTBV indicates that low growth firms, a  common 
characteristic of matured firms, would be more likely to 
return their cash to shareholders in the form of share 
repurchases to divest excess cash. Size of firms as measured 
by natural log of market value (MV) is not important in 
explaining firms’ repurchases decisions.  
5. Conclusions  
Firms buy back shares for mult iple reasons. Those 
motives that are relevant in the western countries may not 
necessarily be prevalent in  the emerg ing countries due to 
different regulations and corporate governance measures. 
This study examines signaling and substitution hypotheses in 
the context of concentrated ownership which is prevalent in 
many emerging markets such as in Malaysia.  It is found 
that firms  in  Malaysia repurchase shares to signal 
undervaluation and better operating performance as well as 
to distribute excess cash. It is also found that firms with low 
growth opportunities choose repurchases to divest off excess 
cash. However, there is no evidence to support that firms 
repurchased shares to substitute for or reduce div idend 
payments.  
There are several future avenues for research regard ing SR 
activities in Malaysia. For example, studies should look 
empirically into the long term accounting and price 
performance of SR and corporate governance measures that 
affect SR decisions. Th is evidence would  be very  important 
in understanding the current trend of corporate payout 
policy. 
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